The vast majority of studies of the effects of issues and the economy on vote choice estimate average effects of these variables across the electorate. We posit that different 
Information and Heterogeneity in Issue Voting: Evidence from the 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan
Do issues affect all voters equally in the voting booth? We know that voters may attach different importance, or salience, to different issues. Several studies of economic voting show that the effects of evaluations of the economy on voter decision-making may vary with a voter's level of information (Gomez and Wilson 2006) . Other studies argue that issues in an election vary in their complexity and cost of information. In particular, issues of foreign affairs may seem to hold less weight than domestic issues or the economy in most elections due to the limited information most voters have about foreign affairs (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989) . Few studies have attempted to model directly this heterogeneity in issue voting as a function of voters' information levels or political sophistication. We set out to test whether issues and the economy have varying effects on vote choice in the case of Taiwan's 2008 presidential election.
The 2008 presidential election in Taiwan stands as an important event in its own right and as a useful case for comparing the electoral effects of domestic issues, foreign affairs issues, and the economy. was below 4 percent; in 2008, 5.75%. While these numbers are not significant by global standards, the economic decline was noticeable on Taiwan and fueled fears that its export-led economy would decline significantly. In a post-election survey conducted by the Taiwan Electoral Democracy Study, people who voted in the presidential election were asked "Would you say that over the past year, the state of the economy of Taiwan has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?" Sixty-five percent of voters believed the economy has worsened, thirty percent believed it has stayed the same, and less than five percent believed it had improved.
Elections in many countries appear to be determined by the economy. The voluminous literature on elections on the US and Europe certainly point to the importance of the economy and other, oftenrelated, domestic issues. But Taiwanese politics has long centered on the national security issues due to its relationship with mainland China. Particularly, national identity debates about whether Taiwan should declare its independence from China or seek unification separate the parties and divide voters. The DPP has promoted proclaiming independence from China; the KMT has opposed independence in favor of maintaining the status quo now and seeking eventual reunification. This national identity issue has been the most salient issue in Taiwanese electoral politics at the outset of Taiwan's democratization .
Due to the heightened importance of national security issues related to China in Taiwan's elections, it stands as an important case for examining the role of heterogeneity in economic voting and the role of national security issues in elections. Traditionally, voters have been thought largely immune to foreign affairs debates. Almond (1950) and Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) A few recent studies have examined information's role in moderating the effects of the economy on vote choice or presidential approval. Mondak, Mutz, and Huckfeldt find that the effect of personal financial situation has a greater effect on presidential approval for less-informed people than for the more informed. Sociotropic evaluations, they find, have a greater effect on presidential approval for more informed people than for the less informed. People who do not have much information about national politics rely on their personal financial status when evaluating the president; people with more information are more sociotropic. Mutz (1992) examines the effects of mass communication on retrospective sociotropic and pocketbook voting. While the mass media exclusively influences sociotropic concerns, personal experiences with unemployment exclusively influence pocketbook concerns; thus personal experiences have an effect on those of low information (see also Weatherford 1983 and Conover et al 1986) .
Contrarily, those of high information exhibit a perception consistent with mass media sources
Further work by Mutz (1993) engages the "role of information in conditioning the politicization of personal economic experience" (p. 483). Utilizing survey data from 1988 and 1989 she shows that the well informed are more likely than the less informed to hold politicians accountable for their personal experiences. Interestingly, less informed voters' evaluations of the state of the nation's economy are less likely to be influenced by these same personal experiences, thus avoiding a contrary finding with her prior study (1992) . What, then, of the general role of mass communication? In a subsequent study, Mutz (1994) finds that media generally facilitate the effect of personal experiences on political preferences across information levels. Across these studies, a clear picture of the role of economic perceptions has not emerged; however, there is ample evidence that economic perceptions depend to some extent on information. Wilson (2001, 2006) study informational heterogeneity and the role of economic evaluations on political behavior. They break with previous scholars by framing the temporal question in terms of attribution: Heterogeneity in the information levels of voters leads to different causal strengths in making political attributions. The ability to associate blame with the person responsible for a given issue depends on the amount of knowledge voters have about it. They hypothesize that it is cognitively easier to blame the President for problems of the nation than for problems of personal finances (2001:901).
Voters of low political sophistication should not be able to make the distant link between the President and their pocketbooks; therefore, we should expect pocketbook voting only among the politically sophisticated. Gomez and Wilson (2001) issue by issue, the percentage of voters in the American National Election Studies who meet all four criteria for issue voting: they place themselves on an issue scale, place both major party candidates on the same scale, see differences between the candidates, and place the candidates in the correct order from left to right. But these studies do not examine whether increasing voter information increases the effect of the issues on vote choice. It could be the case that even when voters meet all four criteria for voting on an issue, the issue has no effect on their choice of candidates, or that the effect of the issue does not vary across voter information levels.
Data and Method
The Taiwan Electoral Democracy Survey (2008) The control variables are dummy variables to represent a voter's party affiliation and ethnicity.
We derive a measure of party identification from the question, "Among the main political parties in our country, including the KMT, DPP, NP, PFP, and TSU, do you think of yourself as leaning toward any particular party?" We code a dummy variable for KMT and DPP, with NP, and TSU, PFP, and no party affiliation as the baseline category. To capture ethnicity, we define dummy variables for Mainlander and Hakka, based on the ethnic group of a respondent's father. The baseline category includes Min-nan and aboriginal groups.
We measure political information using an index drawn from several questions. Following the interview with a respondent, TEDS interviewers are asked to rate the respondent's level of political information on a scale from one, "very low," to four, "very high." While such a measure is seemingly unconventional in its approach, due primarily to biases that may arise if interviewers give higher scores to respondents who appear to be better informed due to socioeconomic characteristics (race, gender, or income, for instance), Zaller (1985a) has found that no such biases exist. In fact, as a measure of relevant information it works at least as well as direct knowledge tests of 10 to 15 point scales (Zaller 1992 p.338) and about as well as a 27-item NES index (Zaller 1985b ). An ideal measure of political information would tell us something about the overall "political belief system" of respondents based on "size", "range" and "organization" (Luskin 1987) . Earlier in the survey, respondents were asked: "Who is the current President of the United States?" "Who is the current premier of our country?" "What institution has the power to interpret the constitution?" A respondent could answer zero to three of these correctly.
Our measure of political information adds the four point interviewer rating and the four point faculty knowledge battery to create a seven-point scale. We rescale the information measure on a -1 to 1 scale to make the results that follow easier to interpret. Responses on the scale are approximately normally distributed with a mean of .04 (see Appendix for variable descriptions).
We include two evaluations of the economy. "National economy" is a three point scale on which a respondent rates the national economy during the past year as better (1), same (0), or worse (-1) than the previous year. "Personal economic condition" uses the same scale to rate the economic situation of the respondent's household. Both measures are heavily skewed toward "worse," or negative responses.
We include the four issue scales that appeared on the survey. Each issue presented respondents with a 11-point scale, which we rescale to -1 to 1 for ease of interpretation:
"Sometimes people will talk about the question of Taiwan "Regarding the question of social welfare, some people believe that the government should merely maintain the current system in order not to increase people' tax. Other people believe that the government should promote social welfare, even though it will lead to tax increase. About where on this scale does your own view lie?" "Looking at Taiwan's overall development, some people believe that large-scale reform is the most important thing, even if it means sacrificing some social stability. Other people believe that stability is the most important and that reform should not be allowed to affect social stability. About where on this scale does your own view lie?"
Respondents were also asked to place the major parties (KMT and DPP) and presidential candidates (Ma and Hsieh) on each of these issue scales. On the issue of independence, the mean placement of Ma is 7.3, closer to unification, while the mean placement of Hsieh is 2.8, closer to independence. The average voter's position is 4.6. On the other three issues, the average placements of the candidates are within one point of each other on the ten point scale. On economic development, Ma is at 6.6, Hsieh at 5.5. On social welfare, Ma is 5.9 with Hsieh at 5.5. And on stability versus reform, the mean placement of Ma is 6, and of Hsieh, 4.9.
To measure issue voting, we could define a voter's position relative to the two candidates using the voter's placement of the candidates, using the mean placement of the candidates by all voters, or by using simply a voter's position on the (rescaled) ten point scale. We opt for the latter measurement strategy. Using a voter's placement of the candidates to define the voter's spatial distance from each candidate raises the possibility of projection bias, whereby a voter places closer to herself on an issue scale the candidate she prefers for non-policy reasons. Projection bias inflates issue voting, which we wish to avoid. A standard solution to projection bias is to measure the spatial distance from the voter to each candidate using the mean placement of the candidate by all voters. But since the candidates are so close together on three issues, the spatial distance measure produces mainly only two different values for all of the voters: one value for the voters to the left of at least one candidate, and one for the voters to the right of at least one candidate. Only a few voters are positioned between the candidates. Therefore, using relative spatial distance to the candidates as a measure of issue voting is infeasible.
The third approach to measuring issue voting is to use simply the voter's position on each issue.
On each issue a theoretical cut-point exists at the midpoint of the candidate's positions. To the left of this cut point, voters will vote for one candidate, to the right they will vote for the other candidate. But as a voter moves further to the left (or right) of this cutpoint, their preference for the closer candidate should increase. Voter utility for the closer candidate will be highest at the extreme end of the scale and then decline linearly across the scale. Therefore, using a voter's position on the issue scale captures the relative utility that a voter receives for the closer candidate.
In addition to the issue positions and economic evaluations, we include in the model an interaction of the information measure and each of the issues and evaluations. The interaction terms will form our test of whether the effect of an issue on vote choice varies by voter information level.
Results
Results from the model appear in Table 1 , which presents the maximum likelihood estimates from the binary logit model, and in Figure 1 , which shows the change in probability of voting for Ma due to a one-unit change in each of the predictors, along with the associated 95 percent confidence intervals.
We later present graphs to unpack the substantive effects of our key interactions. For the other 15% of voters who lack opinions on some issues, one would need a different model.
Several results are clear from Figure 1 . Party affiliation is a very strong predictor of vote choice.
KMT supporters are much more likely to vote for MA while DPP supporters are much more likely to vote for Hsieh. Voters from Mainland China are more likely to vote for Ma, the KMT candidate, while MinNan voters are more likely to vote for Ma, though the effect is not statistically significant.
Among the issues and evaluations of the economy, cross-straits relations clearly dominate. The effect of a voter's position on unification versus independence is statistically significant and has the largest substantive effect of all of the issues. Pro-unification voters are, as expected, more likely to vote for Ma. The effect of independence continues the dominance of the national identity issue in Taiwan's elections, which is somewhat surprising given the heightened concern about the economy during the campaigns.
Evaluations of the national economy are significant as a predictor of vote choice. Evaluations of one's own financial situation are not significant, further confirming the dominance of sociotropic over pocketbook concerns in the voting booth.
None of the other issues are statistically significant. The lack of an effect for what most observers would call "significant" issues in the election is surprising but is probably not due to lack of voter awareness or concern about the issues. The mean placements of the candidates indicates that they Among the issues, independence clearly has the largest substantive effect, and its effect is conditional on voter information. For the least informed voters, independence is barely insignificant as a predictor of vote choice. For the most informed, however, independence is clearly significant and increasing in its effect. This demonstrates that national identity issue tends to have a greater impact on the votes of highly informed voters than on the votes of less informed voters, at least in Taiwan in 2008.
Whether this result applies across nations and across time merits further study.
The only other issue showing an information effect is the environment versus economic development. In this case the issue is not statistically significant for any level of information, but the effect does increase with voter information. Theoretically, the graph should be positive for all value of voter information. When the line crosses into negative territory, as happens below the zero point economic development, a voter's probability of voting for the candidate closer to her on the issue is declining. That means that low information voters in the economic development panel are voting contrary to their issue positions. Again, this result is not statistically significant, but it is interesting. On the issues of social welfare and reform, there is no effect on vote choice for any information level.
Conclusions
In this paper we show first that Taiwan's elections are still driven by the national identity issue.
The independence versus unification issue is still at the heart of Taiwan's electoral politics, even after it has made the transition to democracy and even during a slowing economy. However, economic conditions still matter in Taiwan as in all electorates. And national economic conditions dominate egocentric concerns in Taiwan, as elsewhere.
We show second that the effects of the national identity issues vary by voter information level while evaluations of the national economy largely do not. The national identity issues have more of an effect on the vote of highly informed voters than less informed voters. This finding supports the proposition that variation in national identity voting across space and time may have much to do with variation in information. Even in Taiwan, where national identity issues are always salient and the party positions always distinct, voter information affects the extent to which voters weigh foreign policy in the voting booth.
We also show that other issues-issues that the candidates spend much time talking about-did not affect voter decision-making in Taiwan. Economic development, stability versus reform, and social welfare did not affect the votes of many voters.
We show finally that it is not the case that higher information voters weigh their own economic condition more heavily than national conditions in the voting booth. The opposite appears to be true:
higher information voters use evaluations of the national economy even more than they use evaluations of their personal circumstances and even more than low information voters. Voting sociotropically requires information about the national economy and perhaps also the cognitive ability to attribute blame for the economy. Sociotropic voting may not be an information shortcut, but an information-intensive exercise for many voters.
Voters are heterogeneous in their use of issues in the voting booth. Some voters may weigh some issues more heavily than others in their voting decisions. Some issues may affect some voters more than others. Some voters may know more about some issues than others. And in some countries and political contexts, some issues matter more than others. 
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